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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
CHESTER

G.

VERNIER

EVIDENCE.

State v. Yeiarwood (N. Car.), 101 S. E. 513., Admissibility of evidence of
action of bloodhounds.
In prosecution for arson, evidence that an English bloodhound of established reputation, which had been trained and handled by its owner in a large
number of cases when human beings had been trailed, was put on well-defined
tracks of a person near the margin of burned place and followed them to
defendant's house, where he went up to the bed in which defendant had slept
the night before, was admissible.
Where evidence as to defendant being traced by a bloodhound is proposed
to be introduced, it is proper to allow a witness, familiar with the dogs and
accustomed to handling them, to testify that they are skilled in trailing or
tracking of men and within what time after the making of tracks the dogs
would take up and follow the trail.
HOmICiDE.

State v. Weisengoff (W. Va.), 101 S. E. 451. Homicide in resisting lawful
arrest; contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence has no application in a criminal prosecution, and
where it appears a sheriff sought to arrest the accused by jumping upon the
running board of his automobile while it was in motion and informing him
that he had a warrant for him, and, when he failed to slacken his speed, by then
trying to gain control of the steering wheel, whereupon the speed of the automobile was immediately greatly increased, and continued for a distance of about
800 feet, when the automobile collided with an iron bridge, wrecking the machine and dashing the sheriff to his death against one of the iron columns of
the bridge, the accused is guilty of murder if he could have stopped his machine
and willfully refused to do so and intentionally collided with the bridge; but,
if the collision was accidental, the killing is manslaughter only, and the fact
that the sheriff's efforts to obtain control of the steering wheel may have been
a contributing cause of the collision is no defense.
Resisting an arrest, which a proper officer is trying to make in a lawful
manner by one charged with crime and knowing the officer's authority, is an
unlawful act, and such officer has the legal right to use such reasonable force
as may be necessary to overcome the resistance, and if in resisting or attempting
to escape the accused maliciously kills or fatally wounds the officer while he
is acting in a lawful manner, the homicide amounts to "murder"; but if there
was no intention to kill or do great bodily harm and the killing was purely
accidental, the homicide amounts to "manslaughter" only. Malice is an essential
element in murder of either the first or second degree.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Commonwealth v. Tompkins (Pa.), 108 Atl. 350. Effect of judicial ridicule
of defense of insanity. .
Where insanity was the defense in a murder trial, it was reversible error
for the trial judge to hold up the plea of judicial ridicule, by stating to jury in
instructions that the prisoner was "of a class vulgarly called cranks," and that
"those beings who live with these unsettled minds, who are not taken care of
by friends, relatives, or the state, when caught in the act of crime, must be
punished."
State v. Carrigan (N. J.), 108 Adt. 315. Insanity: irresistible impulse.
Instruction that if "there existed in the defendant's mind an irresistible
impulse to take the life of the deceased, and the shooting took place under the
influence of such an impulse, the defendant cannot be convicted of murder in
the first degree," was erroneous, since, conceding that such impulse may be
considered in determining degree of homicide, the question whether act was
wilful, deliberate, and premeditated, notwithstanding impulse, is for the jury.
The doctrine that a criminal act may be excused or mitigated upon the
notion of an irresistible impulse to commit it, where the offender had the mental
capacity to appreciate his legal and moral duty in respect to it, has no place in
the law.
Dickens v. People (Colo.), 186 Pac. 277. Instruction favorable to defendant
-whether harmless error.
The fact that an instruction submitting second degree murder, which was
not in issue, was favorable to defendant, does not make the error harmless.
Garrigues, C. J., and Burke and Scott, JJ., dissenting.
State v. Terrell (Utah), 186 Pac. 108. Justification for slaying infant
criminal.
Notwithstanding Comp. Laws of 1917, Secs. 1829, 7915, a child between 7
and 14 years of age may violate the law and commit an offense against person
or property the same as an adult person, and it cannot be said as a matter of
law that such a child cannot be shot in defense of habitation, property, or person
under Section 8032, subd. 2.
Breedlove v. State (Ga.), 101 S. E. 709. Deadly weapon.
The accused was convicted of assault with intent to murder. The weapon
used was a pistol., A new trial is sought on the contention that the evidence
shows that the pistol was so loaded as not to be a weapon likely to produce
death. The evidence shows that, while the pistol itself was without mechanical
defect, yet it was loaded only with five cartridges designed for use in a different kind of pistol; that the accused, while a prisoner in jail, pointed the
pistol so loaded at the jailer and ordered him to hold up his hands; and that,
upon the jailer reaching for his own pistol instead of throwing up his hands,
the accused snapped his pistol at the jailer four times, without succeeding in
firing it once. Both the pistol and the cartridges in question were put in evidence for inspection by the jury, and four of the cartridges showed signs of
having been snapped. As to the pistol and cartridges in evidence, one witness
testified: "If the plunger goes far enough against the cap to knock the paint
9ff Of it, as it shows it didl it is, of course, liable to explode, and just why it
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did not do it on this occasion nobody can tell, unless the cartridges went in
just a little too far." Another witness testified: "Even with those cartridges
in it, and even though they were not made for this particular make of pistol,
the chances are, if you were to snap them, the pistol would fire." Held:
(a) The pistol and the cartridges being in evidence, whether or not they
constituted a weapon likely to produce death, was, under all the evidence, a
question exclusively for the jury. Paschal v. State, 68 Ga. 818; Paschal v. State,
125 Ga. 279, 54 S. E. 173; Meriwether v. State, 104 Ga. 500, 30 S. E. 806.
State v. Burdette (S. Car.), 101 S. E. 664. Duty to retreat to avoid killing
in self-defense.
Where deceased and defendant's sister were in the woods on the lands of
the deceased for the unlawful purpose of sexual intercourse, defendant not only
had the right, but it was his duty, to resort to all reasonable means to prevent
his sister and deceased from accomplishing their purpose, though the sister was
of mature years, provided he did not commit a breach of the peace, and the
mere fact that his protest or conduct was calculated to bring on a difficulty,
and did so, did not deprive him of the right of self-defense, if in apparent
danger of losing his life or suffering serious bodily harm, nor was he bound
to retreat.
In a prosecution for homicide, the court in charging on self-defense erred
in stating that the law required defendant to take any reasonable way of safeguarding himself even if it was to "run," the word "run" not having the same
meaning as the word "retreat," when applied to the conduct of one claiming
to have acted in self-defense.
VERDicT.

State v. Levin (N. J.), 108 Atl. 10.
Where the indictment charged both a misdemeanor and a high misdemeanor
(grand larceny), verdict of "guilty of the misdemeanor aforesaid" must be
referred to the charge of misdemeanor, and not of grand larceny.
Walker, Ch., and White and Williams, JJ., dissenting.
WAR.

State v. Wyman (Mont.), 186 Pac. 1. Violation of Sedition Act.
Under Rev. Codes, Sees. 9147, 9148, information charging violation of
Sedition Act, by stating that "our soldiers would act in the same way and
commit the same atrocities as have been reported bf the German soldiers" held
sufficient without setting out the German atrocities, notwithstanding information
charged words to have been spoken "in speaking of the atrocities reported to
have been cbmtitted by the German soldiers in the present war," the latter
quotation being merely parenthetical and no part of the seditidus utterance,
such language being calculated to bring soldiers 'f the United States into contempt, and disrepute, the charge of "atrocity" implying that our soldiers would
be outrageously or wantonly wicked, criminal, vile, cruel, and their conduct
"
extremely horrible and shocking.

